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The events of 11 September and the subsequent anthrax outbreaks in the USA have
opened the world’s eyes to the threat posed by terrorist groups, criminal organizations
and lone operators who will stop at nothing to achieve their goals. The open or covert use
of pathogens and toxins as biological warfare agents can no longer be ruled out. Against
this background, the appearance of an unusual disease must be studied in order to clarify
whether it is a natural or artificially caused occurrence. This issue was recently raised in
discussions with local representatives and relief organizations during a tularemia
epidemic in Kosovo from October 1999 to May 2000. This paper will present a procedure
which attempts to use certain criteria to identify or rule out the use of biological warfare
agents in the event of an unusual outbreak of disease. Data and findings gathered by
routine epidemiologic and microbiological studies often provide only an indirect answer
to this problem. For this reason, various criteria were formulated and points allocated to
represent their importance, allowing us to deduce in a semiquantitative manner the
degree of possibility of an artificial genesis of outbreaks. The significance and character-
ization of each criterion are discussed. An analysis of the tularemia epidemic in Kosovo
based on the procedure described here indicates that a deliberate release of the causative
agent of tularemia, Francisella tularensis, as a biological warfare agent is doubtful. In this
paper, an approach is described to discriminate between the intentional use of biological
warfare agents and natural outbreaks of infectious diseases. The developed model is
flexible and considers the political, military and social analysis of the crisis-afflicted
region, the specific features of the pathogen, and the epidemiologic and clinical char-
acteristics of the epidemic.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Tularemia is a severe bacterial zoonosis of rodents
and lagomorphs (rabbits and hares) caused by
Gram-negative, facultative intracellular bacteria
of the species Francisella tularensis. The subspecies
tularensis (biovar A), which is highly pathogenic
for humans, has been found usually but not
exclusively, in North America, while the subspe-
cies holarctica or, as it was earlier known, subsp.
palaearctica (biovar B), which is less pathogenic,
can be found throughout the entire northern hemi-
sphere [1, 2].
In many cases, tularemia is naturally transmitted
to humans either via small lesions or larger injuries
to theskinormucusmembranes inpersonsskinning
or handling diseased animals, particularly rabbits,
or as a result of the ingestion of contaminated water
or food. Other sources of human infection include
infectious ticks and mosquitoes or infective dusts
and aerosols. Depending on the portal of infection,
local ulcerative processes develop with regional
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lymphadenopathyandintestinal,pulmonaryorsys-
temic,partlysepticemic,types.Whileclinicallyman-
ifested infections with biovar B strains are for the
most part benign, more than 30% of the cases invol-
ving biovar A strains could end in death if therapy is
inadequate or delayed.
Owing to its highly virulent nature, which is
linked to its high degree of airborne infectivity and
facultative intracellular multiplication within
macrophages, and its considerable tenacity, F.
tularensis subsp. tularensis has been used as an
agent in biological weapons programs [3–5].
‘Unusual’ outbreaks of, for example, tularemia,
plague, Q fever, monkey pox or dengue fever in
war-torn or crisis-afflicted regions which for years
had appeared to be free of these diseases have
occasionally given rise to speculation that these
epidemics may have been artificially triggered
[5,6]. This is not surprising, owing to the mimicry
of several biological agents which, for the most
part, are made up of zoonotic pathogens. Against
this background, procedures must be developed
which will allow us to safely discriminate between
natural and artificially induced outbreaks. The
ability to distinguish between the natural occcur-
ence and the deliberate use of biological agents is
also necessary for the strengthening of the Biolo-
gical and Toxin Weapons Convention [7,8].
Adapting existing approaches from the litera-
ture [9–11], we undertook to develop a practicable
working procedure for this purpose. This proce-
dure was intended to allow us to:
1. Analyze, according to specific criteria, data and
findings on new or repeatedly occurring ‘unu-
sual’ epidemics and the politico-military, socio-
economic, medical, epizootologic, epidemiolo-
gic and environmental situation in the outbreak
region.
2. Make plausible statements on the probability of
a natural or artificial outbreak by weighting the
criteria.
3. Conduct a retrospective analysis of earlier epi-
demics and suspected uses of biological warfare
agents using available data.
M E T H O D O L O G Y
An unusual outbreak of disease is assessed in qua-
litative terms using the criteria listed in Tables 1 and
2; ifnecessary, thesecanbesupplemented byfurther
criteria, depending on the scenario. Two categories
of criteria are analyzed separately:
1. Non-conclusive criteria, which may indicate
indirectly that biological warfare agents have
been used.
2. Conclusive criteria, which allow us to directly
infer that a military or terrorist attack making
use of biological agents has taken place.
Each criterion is assigned a value on a scale of
0–3, depending on the data collected in the study
of the source of infection (this includes inter-
views, inspections and medical, epidemiologic,
zoological, entomologic, microbiological and im-
munologic analyses), on the analysis of the
Table 1 Non-conclusive criteria for assessing an epidemic in order to rule out the use of a biological warfare agent
No. Criterion
Assessment
(possible points)
Weighting
factor
Maximum
number of
points
1. Existence of a biological risk 0–3 2 6
2. Existence of a biological threat 0–3 3 9
3. Special aspects of the biological agent 0–3 3 9
4. Peculiarities of the geographic
distribution of the biological agent
0–3 1 3
5. High concentration of the biological
agent in the environment
0–3 2 6
6. Peculiarities of the transmission mode
of the biological agent
0–3 1 3
7. Peculiarities of the intensity
and dynamics of the epidemic
0–3 2 6
8. Peculiarities of the time of the epidemic 0–3 1 3
9. Unusually rapid spread of the epidemic 0–3 1 3
10. Limitation of the epidemic to a specific population 0–3 1 3
11. Peculiarities of the clinical manifestation 0–3 1 3
Total 54
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politico-military, social and ecological situation
and on intelligence information gathered:
0—Criterion has been ruled out or no data are
available.
1—There are peculiarities or suspicions but both
are uncertain and indistinct.
2—There are obvious peculiarities or indications of
biological warfare agents, whose causes have yet
to be clarified for certain or which have not been
proven unambiguously.
3—There are considerable peculiarities or devia-
tions from the expected course of the disease or
there is clear indication or proof of a biological
attack.
The non-conclusive criteria are also weighted
according to their usefulness for assessing the
possible use of a biological warfare agent. For this
purpose, a multiplication factor (weighting factor)
is used which has been determined on the basis of
the operational, medical and epidemiologic sig-
nificance of the individual characteristic:
1—Criterion can also be explained by natural
causes (non-weighted criterion).
2—Criterioncanbeexplainedbynaturalcausesonly
to a limited extent or under special circumstances,
or arouses the suspicion that a biological warfare
agent has been used (weighted by a factor of 2).
3—Criterion cannot be explained either fully or at
all by natural causes, or indicates the likelihood of
the use of a biological warfare agent (weighted by
a factor of 3).
In terms of content, emphasis is placed on three
groups of characteristics (Tables 1 and 2): (1) the
political, military and social analysis of the crisis-
afflicted region (criteria 1–2); (2) the specific fea-
tures of the pathogen (criteria 3–5); and (3) the
epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of the
epidemic (criteria 6–11).
Conclusive criteria provide direct evidence of a
biological attack and thus are considered proof of
an attack should further indisputable characteris-
tics also be identified.
The peculiarities covered by the above criteria
are discussed in detail in the Results and Discus-
sion section.
The likelihood that an epidemic has an artificial
cause can be determined by non-conclusive and
conclusive criteria. This is done by first determin-
ing the total number of points while taking into
consideration the assessment and weighting of the
various non-conclusive criteria (Table 1). The
number of points is then compared with an arbi-
trary scale of probability and then assessed as
shown in Table 3.
Table 2 Conclusive criteriaa for assessing an epidemic in order to rule out the use of a biological warfare agent
No. Criteria
Assessment
(possible points)
Weighting
factor
Maximum
number of
points
1. Identification of the agentb as a biological warfare agent 0–3 N/A N/A
2. Proof of the release of the agentc as a biological weapon 0–3 N/A N/A
aConclusive criteria are not weighted, since they are, by definition, conclusive proof. For this reason, they are taken into
special consideration in the final result.
bPathogens or toxin.
cFindings of biological warfare agents and/or means for its dissemination (e.g. spray device, remains of special rockets,
containers).
Level
Assumption of a
biological attack
Confidence
(%)
Limits given a
maximum of 54 points
(number of points)
3 Highly likely 95–100 51–54
2 Likely 67–94 36–50
1 Doubtful 34–66 18–35
0 Unlikely 0–33 0–17
The likelihood of the possible use of a biological warfare agent is divided into
four levels. The levels of confidence have been arbitrarily set. They have also been
used to calculate the limits for the assessment, given the maximum number of
points.
Table 3 Assessing the likelihood of
the use of a biological warfare agent
based on non-conclusive criteria
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In determining the final result, we also take into
account conclusive criteria, if available, each of
which can be decisive on its own (Table 4). The
highest assessment of the various categories of
criteria is decisive for the final result.
Depending on how much is known, the number
of non-conclusive or conclusive criteria can be
increased. In this case, the limits for the non-con-
clusive criteria must be recalculated, taking into
consideration the weighting factors and confi-
dence levels (see Tables 1–3).
R E S U L T S A N D D I S C U S S I O N
The above procedure will be evaluated here using
data collected by a team of WHO experts and
members of the Institute of Public Health in Pris-
tina and the Institute of Microbiology at the
Bundeswehr Medical Academy in Munich during
a tularemia epidemic in Kosovo in 1999 and 2000
[12,13]. This team of epidemiologists, ecologists,
microbiologists and social workers was charged
with analyzing the extent and causes of the epi-
demic and with making recommendations for
effective preventive measures.
A microagglutination assay, a screening ELISA
and a confirmatory Western blot assay were used
for the serodiagnosis of tularemia, and a lipopo-
lysaccharide (LPS)-specific capture ELISA of the
Institute of Microbiology was used for the antigen
testing of F. tularensis [14]. Data collected in the
course of the laboratory, clinical, epidemiologic
and ecological tests were analyzed according to
the criteria in Tables 1 and 2 in order to provide
evidence for the likelihood of the working hypoth-
esis of ‘natural epidemic’ (Tables 5 and 6).
Table 4 Assessment of the overall result, taking into consideration the criteria of the various categories
Categories of criteria
Assumption of a biological attack Not conclusive and/or Conclusive 1 and/or Conclusive 2
Highly likely/certain 3 3 3
Likely 2 2 2
Doubtful 1 1 1
Unlikely 0 0 0
The highest assessment of the various categories of criteria is to be considered the final result. The classification of the
criteria is based on the values determined in Tables 1–3.
Table 5 Assessment of the tularemia epidemic in Kosovo: non-conclusive criteria
No. Criteria
Assessment
(possible points 0–3)
Weighting
factor
Number of
points
1. Existence of a biological risk 1 2 2
2. Existence of a biological threat 0 3 0
3. Special aspects of the biological agent Not possible 3 N/A
4. Peculiarities of the geographic distribution
of the biological agent
3 1 3
5. High concentration of the biological agent in
the environment
2 2 4
6. Peculiarities of the intensity
and dynamics of the epidemic
2 2 4
7. Peculiarities of the transmission mode of the
biological agent
1 1 1
8. Peculiarities of the time of the epidemic 0 1 0
9. Unusually rapid spread of the epidemic 1 1 1
10. Limitation of the epidemic to a
specific population
0 1 0
11. Peculiarities of the clinical manifestation 1 1 1
Total 16
Explanations of the various criteria and their assessment are provided in the text.
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In the following, the various criteria are
explained in detail and compared with the avail-
able facts from the analysis of the epidemic in
Kosovo.
Non-conclusive criteria
Existence of a biological risk
A biological risk is considered to be the presence of
a political or terrorist environment from which a
biological attack could originate. A biological risk
arises, for example, if states, groups or individual
persons have access to biological warfare agents
and the necessary means of distributing them and
are willing to use them [15]. This also includes
armed conflicts in connection with the suspected
or proven development, production and/or
storage of biological weapons. In addition, a bio-
logical risk is to be assumed if, in the area con-
cerned, biological warfare agents are developed,
produced or stored and could be released as a
result of poor plant security or if the plant itself is
destroyed. The existence of such risks raises the
possibility that an attack with, or a release of,
biological warfare agents has taken place and is
thus to be given a weighting factor of 2.
Natural biological hazards for military forces
are, however, always to be considered if forces are
deployed in enzootically highly active natural foci
of zoonoses whose pathogens could also be used
as biological warfare agents.
There is a considerable risk of infection for
civilians and military personnel in areas in which
armed conflicts have destroyed natural ecosys-
tems and in which, as a result of insufficient waste
management, pest control, and maintenance of
water and food quality, sanitary conditions are
so unsatisfactory that zoonoses such as tularemia
can spread and cause epidemics.
At the time of the epidemic outbreak in the fall
of 1999, the political situation in Kosovo was tense.
The military conflict there resulted in the occupa-
tion and control of Kosovo by the international
KFOR, which the central government in Serbia at
that time did not recognize. Their military and
political goals, which were probably linked to an
expulsion of the ethnic Albanian population from
the region, meant that a certain biological risk
could not be entirely ruled out. It was speculated
that Yugoslavia had the capability to produce
nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) weapons
[16]. For these reasons, this criterion was assessed
as having 1 of 3 possible points.
Existence of a biological threat
A biological threat is to be assumed if, in the
environment of a biological risk, individual states,
groups or persons openly threaten to use biologi-
cal warfare agents or if a specific interest in their
use can be assumed [15]. A biological threat would
considerably increase the likelihood of a biological
attack and has thus been weighted with a factor
of 3.
To the best of our knowledge, there was at no
time any indication of either an open or covert
biological threat in Kosovo; thus no points were
allocated for this criterion.
Special aspects of the biological agent
Given the current state of research and technology,
it cannot be ruled out that a potential aggressor has
genetically manipulated certain characteristics of
pathogens or toxins prior to their use as biological
warfare agents. This can include measures which
make detection and identification more difficult or
which increase the virulence, environmental sta-
bility and resistance to prophylactic and therapeu-
tic measures. The appearance of pathogens such as
the variola virus, which have been virtually era-
dicated, or of uncommon epidemics such as the
plague in central Europe, would indicate an extre-
mely unusual epidemiologic constellation. Proof
Table 6 Assessment of the tularemia epidemic in Kosovo: conclusive criteria
No. Criteria
Assessment
(possible points 0–3)
Weighting
factor
Number of
points
1. Identification of the agent as a biological
warfare agent
0 N/A N/A
2. Proof of the release of the agent by a
biological weapon
0 N/A N/A
Explanations of the various criteria and their assessment are provided in the text.
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that the pathogen does not naturally occur in the
outbreak area or that it is a so-called ‘newly emer-
ging’ or ‘re-emerging’ infectious disease would
point towards an artificial cause. This criterion has
thus been weighted with a factor of 3. For reasons of
clarity, however, this pathogen must be isolated and
characterized so that natural causes of genetic
manipulation, such as mutation or recombination,
canberuledout,andsothattheextentandmethodof
genetic manipulation can be determined.
Unfortunately, technical and organizational rea-
sons made it impossible to culture and analyze the
pathogen during the tularemia epidemic in
Kosovo. For this reason, this criterion cannot be
rated and is thus inapplicable to our assessment.
As a result, there is a maximum of 43 points for
non-conclusive criteria instead of the 54 points
shown in Table 1.
Peculiarities of the geographic distribution
of the disease
It is significant for the assessment, and unusual
from an epidemiologic perspective, if the disease,
and thus the pathogen species or strain (subspe-
cies), is identified in the region concerned for the
first time ever or again after a long period of time.
It would be particularly unusual if explosive epi-
demics involving diseases such as Ebola fever,
which are endemic only in certain parts of the
world were to occur in central Europe. The situa-
tion is different when it concerns outbreaks caused
by indigenous pathogens. In this case, not only
extensive epidemiologic, epizootic, ecological,
microbiological and forensic analyses, but also
the molecular biological subdifferentiation of
pathogen isolates, are required in order to differ-
entiate with certainty between a natural spread of
the pathogen and its artificial release. The situation
would be enormously complicated if a potential
aggressor were to rely on indigenous natural ani-
mal reservoirs and vectors to disseminate, for
example, a zoonosis pathogen. Assumptions along
these lines were expressed during the outbreaks of
West Nile encephalitis on the eastern coast of the
USA in 1999 [17]. Similar complications were
encountered during investigations into an explo-
sive epidemic of salmonellosis in The Dalles, Ore-
gon (USA) in 1984, which was triggered by the
deliberate contamination of salad bars with the
endemic species of Salmonella typhimurium [18].
Since it is difficult to differentiate between nat-
ural and artificial causes when we are faced with
the special geographic spreading of epidemics, no
additional weighting has been specified for this
criterion.
In Kosovo, no cases of tularemia in humans had
been observed for decades, and there were no
known epizootic or enzootic sources of infection
in this region. As a result, the sudden reappear-
ance and the wide-range epidemic spread of this
zoonosis seemed so unusual that this criterion was
allocated 3 points. It must be taken into considera-
tion, however, that tularemia has been endemic in
other regions of the Balkans for a long time, as
shown by epidemics and sporadic cases in Bosnia,
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro during the last 7
years. For example, the first tularemia epidemic in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was observed
during the years 1999–2000, starting in 1998, with
38 people afflicted mainly with the tonsillophar-
yngeal type in the region of Sokobanja. This was
the result of an infection by F. tularensis subsp.
palaearctica, which was isolated from dead rodents
of the genus Apodemus [19].
Whenever there is an outbreak of tularemia in
Europe, we must ask ourselves whether the dis-
ease is caused by strains of the less pathogenic
subspecies F. tularensis holarctica (biovar B) or by
the highly pathogenic subspecies tularensis (biovar
A), which is considered to be a possible agent of
biological warfare. With the exception of a few
recently published data [2], strains of biovar A
have been found only in North America. Since our
investigations did not succeed in isolating the
pathogen for further identification, this question
can only be answered indirectly on the basis of
clinical observations. Although there was a rela-
tively high percentage of tularemia patients in
Kosovo who required stationary treatment, and
numerous cases in which the course of the disease
was severe and lasted for several months, the latter
were most likely the result of improper or insuffi-
cient antibiotic therapies. In general, the harmless
course of the disease in the majority of cases, the
effectiveness of common antibiotics and, above all,
the fortunate absence of fatalities indicate that the
infection was caused by biovar B, which is ende-
mic in Europe.
High concentration of the biological agent
in the environment
If a biological agent is released artificially, e.g. as
an aerosol, we can expect to find it in unusually
high concentrations in the air, soil and drinking or
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surface water over a large area. This criterion has
been weighted with a factor of 2.
Relatively high concentrations of pathogens
predominantly in selected areas may, however,
be found also in the case of natural contamination,
if, for example, dead rodents infected with tular-
emia enter drinking-water reservoirs [20].
The almost exclusive dominance of oropharyn-
geal types of tularemia in Kosovo indicates, in
all likelihood, alimentary ingestion of a relatively
high number of bacteria (oral infection dose: 105
bacteria), which could be explained by consider-
able contamination of drinking water or food.
In order to identify possible sources of infection
and transmission factors, 158 samples of rodents
and drinking water were analyzed by capture
ELISA. These samples were primarily collected
in the households of tularemia patients. It was
concluded from the investigation results that the
tularemia infection had been caused by rodents
[12,13]. These had previously been identified as a
source of infection due to the fact that an explosive
increase in rodent populations coincided with the
occurrence of tularemia (Table 7). Testing rodent
feces for F. tularensis antigens proved to be an
extremely efficient and practicable method of
identifying infection sources and transmission fac-
tors in the households. For example, pathogen
antigens were identified in seven of the 55 samples
of mouse and rat feces from households with
confirmed cases of tularemia. In addition, F. tular-
ensis antigens were identified in the internal
organs of two mice captured alive and in three
mouse carcasses which were found close to or in
drinking-water wells. It thus appears that in cer-
tain places in Kosovo there was a massive con-
tamination of living areas, drinking water and
food storage sites which was most likely caused
by infected sinanthropic rodents and/or small
mammals. At special risk of exposure were those
persons living in rodent-infested households with
low standards of hygiene. Based on these findings,
this criterion was allocated 2 points.
As mentioned above, it must always be taken
into consideration that the initial infection of the
rodents could have been artificial. There was,
however, no evidence for this in Kosovo.
No evidence of pathogens could be found in the
few large drinking-water reservoirs and soil sam-
ples (27 samples in total) that were analyzed. If
outbreaks were to reoccur in the future, compre-
hensive and systematic investigations of water and
soil would be necessary in order to draw well-
founded conclusions.
Peculiarities of the intensity and dynamics
of the epidemic
The intensity and dynamics of an epidemic are
characterized by the percentage of cases of a dis-
ease per unit of time or the total number of cases.
Explosive epidemics of diseases which tend to take
a slower epidemic course are an indication of an
unusual genesis. A correlation between the con-
centration and virulence of a biological agent, the
manner in which it has been spread, and the
frequency and severity of the disease is to be
expected. Taking into consideration the type of
pathogen, we can also use a mathematical model
to draw theoretical conclusions about the course
and the time at which an explosive epidemic began
[21]. This mathematical model for artificial explo-
sive epidemics triggered by aerosolized agents
such as the pathogens of tularemia and other
zoonoses, provide us with estimated values for
the number of cases of infection and disease and
the probable dynamics of the epidemic. However,
this procedure does not allow the recognition of
intentional outbreaks and the analysis of delayed
epidemics.
Since intensity and dynamics can fluctuate con-
siderably, depending on when the epidemic is
recognized, the main modes of infection and trans-
mission, the causal agent and the efficiency of
therapeutic and hygienic measures, and since
the epidemic may have natural causes, this and
the following criteria have not been weighted.
According to the Institute of Public Health, there
had been no reported cases of tularemia in humans
in Kosovo since 1974 before this outbreak. Older
inhabitants have, however, given accounts of a
disease similar to tularemia in the 1940s. We
must therefore assume that we are dealing with
Table 7 Evidence of Francisella tularensis antigens in
animal samples
Sample type Number Positive
Rodent feces 55 7
Internal organs from mice 59 2
Carcasses 3 3
Total 117 12 (10%)
The presence of antigen was tested by a specific highly
sensitive enzyme immunoassay.
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a reappearance of this zoonosis. More than 300
clinical presumptive diagnoses were confirmed by
serologic tests (Table 8) [12].
Due to the apparent absence of tularemia prior
to the beginning of the epidemic, this outbreak is to
be rated as unusually intensive. For this reason,
this criterion has been allocated a score of 2.
Peculiarities of the transmission mode of the biological
agent
Different pathogens prefer different paths of infec-
tion. For example, the pathogen of Q fever can be
disseminated in an aerosol composed of air-dried
infectious sheep placentas or of feces from infected
ticks. Bubonic plague is transmitted to humans by
fleas from infected rats. By contrast, the sudden
appearance of primary pneumonic plague when it
is not preceded by cases of bubonic plague, as had
appeared to happen in Surat in September 1994, is
to be considered unusual [22]. Such deviations
from natural paths of infection could indicate that
biological agents have been deliberately dissemi-
nated.
In general, natural epidemics will feature paths
of transmission which are typical for the pathogen
in question and its natural hosts. It is extremely
difficult to determine peculiarities of tularemia
transmission, since, even under natural condi-
tions, cases of disease can be caused by infections
transmitted by entirely different modes. For exam-
ple, the ulceroglandular type is predominant in
Scandinavia. In this type, the pathogen is trans-
mitted to humans by insects or ticks or through
skin lesions after direct contact with contaminated
material or animals. Cases of pulmonary tularemia
have occurred in the past in Austria and other
countries in connection with the processing of
sugar beets. The cause of the disease appears to
have been infected rodents or their feces which,
when the sugar beets were being washed and cut,
were disseminated as an aerosol and inhaled by
the workers [23]. Larger epidemic outbreaks of a
special pulmonary type known as ‘trench tulare-
mia’ developed in the years 1941–42 among both
the civilian Soviet population and the German
and Soviet armed forces along the Rostov and
Stalingrad front lines. Because of the long-term
and widespread damage inflicted by war on the
ecology, the explosive growth of the rodent popu-
lation and the intensive exposure of civilians and
soldiers to the pathogen (e.g. contact with con-
taminated straw) it can safely be assumed that this
tularemia epidemic had natural causes, and could
not have been a biological warfare attack, as sev-
eral authors have claimed [5,24].
Since the clinical picture in Kosovo was domi-
nated by an oropharyngeal type of tularemia, it is
highly likely that the pathogen was food-borne. It
could not be ruled out, however, that ulcerogland-
ular or other types of tularemia associated with
rodents remained undiscovered. Nor can deliber-
ate contamination of food and drinking water,
which might have led to this uniform clinical
picture, be ruled out with absolute certainty. For
this reason, a value of 1 was allocated to this
criterion.
Peculiarities of the time of the epidemic
Epidemics of certain infectious diseases (e.g. influ-
enza) occur in increased numbers during certain
seasons, either because they are dependent on the
weather, or they occur after certain intervals in
Table 8 Tularemia outbreak in Ko-
sovo: summary of the serologic test
results
Results
Tests
Sera
n
Positive
n (%)
Borderline
n (%)
Negative
n (%)
Screening and
confirmationa
494 185 (38) 10 (2)b 299 (61)
Agglutinationa 418 142 (34) 21 (5)b 255 (61)
Total 912 327 (36) 31 (3) 554 (61)
aLaboratory diagnosis was conducted in Kosovo from 21 April 2000 to 3 May
2000 in order to analyze 494 sera, making use of a screening ELISA, a
microagglutination test and a confirmatory Western blot. In addition, there were
418 sera which were analyzed afterwards by local laboratory personnel using the
microagglutination test left behind.
bAll sera which were borderline in ELISA were found to be negative using the
Western blot.
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time. If the temporal context of an epidemic is not
‘typical’ and an epidemic does not conform with
accepted temporal patterns, then there is some
basis to the claim that an epidemic has artificial
causes. This assumption is given further confirma-
tion if possible biological risks or threats are
known.
In this respect, there was nothing peculiar about
the epidemic in Kosovo. Epidemiologic and clin-
ical data, as well as our retrospective serologic
tests, indicated that the epidemic began in October
1999, peaked in January 2000 and subsided in
April–May 2000 [12]. If we consider the dynamics
and the seasonableness of this epidemic, we will
see a typical epidemiologic pattern for natural
tularemia epidemics. They frequently start in late
summer, when epizootic diseases spread among
wild rodents and the vectors of the pathogen (such
as ticks and mosquitoes) are abundant. Epidemics
can also begin in the fall and winter months once
infected rodents and small mammals enter areas of
human habitation in search of food and shelter,
which we think was the case here.
Unusually rapid spread of the epidemic
The speed at which an epidemic spreads is deter-
mined by the virulence, resistance and concentra-
tion of the pathogen, the contagiousness of the
disease and the intensity of the transmission pro-
cess (very high in the case of aerosols), on the one
hand, and on the susceptibility and disposition of
the exposed population (including immunity), on
the other. If F. tularensis were suddenly transmis-
sible from person to person or multiresistant to
antibiotics, the spread of a tularemia epidemic, for
example, could be unusually rapid. This would
indicate the presence of genetically modified
organisms. A more or less uniform dissemination
of the pathogen in the environment can also lead to
a simultaneous mass infection of people and to a
swift spread of the epidemic. This would be the
case in particular if a biological agent were artifi-
cially released as an aerosol or over drinking-water
reservoirs. Here, too, natural causes cannot be
entirely ruled out, as has been shown above in
the cases of Q fever and tularemia.
It is possible that in Kosovo, too, the tularemia
epidemic among humans was preceded by a dra-
matic spread of the pathogen within the rodent
population. We can assume that the population
explosion of the rodents occurred in what had
obviously been ‘dormant’ natural foci of tulare-
mia, from which the zoonosis was then spread
throughout the entire region of Kosovo. It was
nevertheless unusual that within a relatively short
period of time cases of tularemia appeared
throughout almost the entire Albanian territory
of Kosovo. This unusual occurrence was given a
value of 1.
Limitation of the epidemic to a specific population
Biological attacks can be directed against large het-
erogeneous population groups and military contin-
gents or against selected target groups. If political,
military, ethnic, religious or other motives can be
identified, this would lend credence to the assump-
tion that an attack using pathogens or toxins as
biological agents has taken place.
It would also be conceivable that certain persons
or population groups given sufficient prior warn-
ing about a biological attack and could have been
spared from an epidemic by way of preventive
measures (e.g. receiving vaccinations, adhering
strictly to instructions to boil drinking water).
On the other hand, a number of natural causes
could also play a role when it comes to this criter-
ion. For example, poor hygienic and living condi-
tions can facilitate the spread of diseases in certain
population groups.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no
reliable findings which indicate that an increase
in cases of illness among national and interna-
tional military forces was observed the tularemia
outbreak in Kosovo. There was nevertheless rea-
son for believing that certain groups could have
been targeted. It appeared that almost all the
victims of the epidemic were ethnic Kosovo
Albanians. It must be pointed out, however, that
the Institute of Public Health in Pristina had
almost no reports or test materials from the areas
under Serbian administration. Just how little infor-
mation was exchanged is also shown by the fact
that the health authority in Belgrade did not have
detailed information on the tularemia outbreak in
Kosovo [19]. It was not possible to answer the
question of whether vaccination against tularemia
was performed in the Serbian population of former
Yuogoslavia.
Thus we cannot assume with any certainty that
the Serbian regions in Kosovo were deliberately
spared the tularemia epidemic. For this reason, no
points were allocated for this criterion.
According to findings made so far, the zoonosis
spread primarily through the western regions,
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which are populated with ethnic Albanians and
which were severely affected by the war on
account of the widespread damage to housing
and the mines laid in gardens and fields. As it
turned out, the mostly rural inhabitants in these
regions lived under very poor hygienic conditions.
Peculiarities of the clinical manifestation
If a pathogen is to be efficiently ingested, biological
agents would most likely be released in the air as
aerosols or would be used to contaminate food and
drinking water in acts of sabotage. As a result, we
could expect primarily pulmonary manifestations
(bronchopneumonia) or typhoidal types of symp-
toms if an aerosol attack had occurred, and mainly
intestinal manifestations if the tularemia pathogen
had been ingested.
Particularly severe clinical courses or an unu-
sually high mortality rate could point towards
atypically virulent pathogen strains, either natural
or genetically manipulated.
As mentioned above, almost all of the confirmed
cases in Kosovo exhibited the clinical picture of
oropharyngeal tularemia. This type coincided
with a one-sided swelling of the glandula sub-
mandibularis, or lymph node swelling and gran-
uloma formation in the throat and lower jaw
region, thus indicating the likelihood of food-
borne transmission.
The course of the disease was relatively mild,
and the infection responded well to adequate
antibiotic treatment, which consisted primarily
of streptomycin. The peculiarity of the surpris-
ingly uniform clinical picture has already been
taken into consideration, so no further points were
allocated here.
The clinical diagnosis was made considerably
more difficult by the simultaneous appearance of
mumps (and presumably tuberculosis) in many
cases. For this reason, a significant percentage of
the primary suspected cases were not confirmed in
the laboratory as tularemia (approximately 50%).
In the tests which followed, serologic evidence of
an acute mumps infection was found in approxi-
mately 30% of the cases in which tularemia was
presumed but not confirmed. The possibility of
mixed epidemics such as this must always be
taken into consideration when assessing the out-
break of a disease, since they complicate the epi-
demiologic situation and can present additional
difficulties for the investigation of unusual out-
breaks.
Conclusive criteria
Identification of the agent as a biological warfare
agent
If a biological warfare agent can be identified
beyond doubt as the cause of an epidemic, then
this is considered proof of a biological warfare
attack and all other tests are, in principle, unne-
cessary. This is only possible, however, if recog-
nized epidemiologic, microbiological, molecular
biological, immunologic and forensic procedures
are used to show an indisputable connection
between the deliberate release of a pathogen or
toxin and the outbreak of a disease, individual
cases of disease, death or other health disorders.
There was no indication that this had been the case
in Kosovo.
Proof of the release of the agent by a biological weapon
Such proof includes objects or actions which indi-
cate that a pathogen has been intentionally dis-
seminated as a biological warfare agent by
identified biological weapons. Here, as well, the
facts would speak for themselves and substantiate
a biological attack.
There was no such proof found in Kosovo.
Remarks by the head epidemiologist at the Insti-
tute of Public Health about unidentifiable
ampoules and white powdery substances which
were found in and around various wells directly
after the war could be neither verified nor tested.
When tularemia appeared in northern Bosnia in
1995 for the first time in decades, the factions
involved in the Balkan war also reportedly
accused each other of having used tularemia
pathogens as biological warfare agents [22]. How-
ever, no conclusive evidence was furnished for a
biological attack.
C O N C L U S I O N S
In order to investigate unusual epidemics, we
require information about the ecologic and biolo-
gical characteristics of the pathogen, the natural
routes of infection, the pathogenesis, clinical pic-
ture and immunology of certain infectious dis-
eases, the epidemiologic and epizootologic
situation in the epidemic foci, and the special
characteristics of an artificial dissemination of this
pathogen. It is also absolutely essential that there is
an adequate and efficient field analysis of the
epidemic, an examination of the clinical picture
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and the initial epidemiologic situation, and a col-
lection of representative samples and data for
statistically sound epidemiologic, epizootologic,
medical and laboratory analysis. This necessitates
properly trained mobile investigation teams with
appropriate technical equipment. These teams
must include both civilian and military forces.
The assessment procedure presented here is a
first step towards identifying the causes of an
unusual epidemic in the most objective manner
possible. The quality of the analysis depends to a
large extent, of course, on the availability of suffi-
cient and valid data, and the results of investiga-
tion.
The findings from the focus analysis of the
tularemia outbreak in Kosovo showed that there
was also a risk of exposure for the KFOR soldiers
stationed there and that infection would have been
possible if hygienic standards had not been main-
tained.
Unfavorable hygienic and anti-epidemic situa-
tions (i.e. epidemic outbreaks of dangerous infec-
tious diseases such as tularemia, hantavirus
infections or Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever)
in crisis-afflicted regions require us to carry out
specific focus investigations among the affected
civilian population and in the affected territories to
identify the reasons for the epidemic. Such inves-
tigations can provide important information about
the spread of the epidemic, clinical picture, ther-
apeutic effectiveness, possible transmission fac-
tors, and prevalence and incidence of the
infection in humans and animal populations,
and can allow us to make recommendations about
prevention, prophylaxis and treatment.
In our procedure-based assessment of the tular-
emia outbreak in Kosovo, the analysis of non-
conclusive criteria resulted in 16 of a possible 43
points (37%); conclusive criteria were not avail-
able. As illustrated in Table 3, it is thus doubtful
that an intentional dissemination of a pathogen
was the cause of the tularemia epidemic in
Kosovo.
The natural causes of the development of this
epidemic could be explained as follows. In the fall
of 1999, there was an unusually rapid growth of
field mice (Apodemus agrarius) and rat populations;
this appears to have been caused by the surplus of
food in unharvested fields and in vacant or
destroyed houses and storage buildings. This
would explain why the majority of tularemia cases
occurred in those areas of western Kosovo where
damage to houses had been greatest. Although
natural foci of tularemia in Kosovo had not been
identified prior to this outbreak, we can assume
that the origin of the infection is to be found in the
western mountainous regions from which this
zoonosis was likely to have spread to central
Kosovo and the eastern regions with the rodent
migration. In search of food and shelter in the fall
and winter months, the rodents appear to have
settled in human dwellings. Infected animals, and
their feces or carcasses, are likely to have contami-
nated drinking water and grain and food supplies.
Ignorance of the risk of infection and the resulting
lack of hygienic measures led to food-borne infec-
tions in humans. The rodent population had
decreased drastically by February–March 2000,
probably as a result of the cold winter, food
shortages or the zoonosis itself. As a consequence,
the number of new cases dropped in late spring.
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